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ick up a tube of sunscreen, a tennis racquet, 
an iPod, or any number of other consumer 
products, and there’s a good chance that it’s 
been “nano-enabled,” meaning it contains nanoscale 
particles designed to give it some beneficial feature. 
An estimated $147 billion worth of nano-enabled 
commercial and consumer products were sold in 
2007, according to Lux Research, a market analysis 
firm in New York City. Citing the firm’s latest esti-
mates, Lux analyst David Hwang predicts that figure 
could top $3.1 trillion by 2015, reinforcing a broad 
view that nanotechnology is fueling a new industrial 
revolution.
Yet nanotechnology’s spread through the mar-
ket has been met with mounting concerns over the 
potential human health effects of these miraculous 
materials. Because of their small size—100 nano-
meters or less—nanomaterials have unique physical 
properties that can influence their uptake, distribu-
tion, and behavior in the body. Indeed, some nano-
particles have been shown to penetrate into cells, 
where they can trigger inflammatory responses and 
oxidative stress. 
Canada and California recently took the unprece-
dented step of imposing mandated disclosure require-
ments on nanomaterial use and toxicity assessment. 
Issued 29 January 2009, Canada’s law targets domes-
tic companies and institutions that manufacture or 
buy more than 1 kilogram of nanomaterial per year. 
According to the new regulations, these entities must 
now reveal how much nanomaterial they use, how 
they use it, and what they know about its toxicity. 
California’s law, issued 2 February 2009, limits its 
scope to carbon nanotubes, a class of nanomaterial 
used in electronics, optics, and biomedical applica-
tions. Under the new regulation, by February 2010 
companies that manufacture, import, or export car-
bon nanotubes in California must disclose informa-
tion about the toxicity and environmental impacts of 
their products. 
Meanwhile, experts in nanotoxicology and 
risk assessment have become increasingly polar-
ized, represented on one side by the National 
Research Council (NRC) and on the other by 
the National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI), 
a government-wide collaboration coordinated by 
the National Science and Technology Council in 
the Executive Office of the President. In February 
2008, the Nanotechnology Environmental and 
Health Implications (NEHI) Working Group of 
the NNI released a document titled Strategy for 
Nanotechnology-Related Environmental, Health, and 
Safety Research. This document is meant to present 
the U.S. government’s agenda for studying nano-
particle hazards, and describes 246 related projects 
that were ongoing in 2006, representing a combined 
investment for that year of $68 million. The docu-
ment also purports to “address prioritized research 
areas . . . and to advance knowledge and support 
risk decision-making—both of which are essential 
for the responsible development of nanotechnology.”
Clayton Teague directs the National Nano-
technology  Coordination  Office,  which  was 
re  sponsible for drafting the federal strategy. He says
                
the strategy was developed in extensive con-
sultation with regulatory agencies, research 
organizations, the business community, and 
nongovernmental organizations. “We believe 
the strategy represents needs and agreements 
about what the agencies plan to do,” he says. 
“Funding agencies are telling us that they’re 
using the document to formulate solicita-
tions for future research in this area.” 
But on 25 February 2009, a panel assem-
bled by the NRC issued its own report, 
describing what it calls serious short  comings 
in the strategy document. According to the 
NRC panel, which was assembled at the 
request of the NNI, the strategy exposes 
weaknesses in the government’s understand-
ing of potential nanotechnology risks today 
and does not adequately address how they 
will be assessed in the future. NRC panel 
member Mark Weisner, a professor of civil 
and environmental engineering at Duke 
University, claims that many of the research 
programs described in the NNI’s document 
don’t actually address environmental, health, 
and safety (EHS) concerns. “If you take this 
portfolio at face value, it overstates the true 
level of effort in federally financed [nano-
technology-related] EHS research,” he says. 
Toxicity Unknowns
No case of human toxicity has been linked 
to the roughly 2,000 types of nano-
materials in commercial use or develop-
ment today. Yet those risks can’t be ruled 
out, says Günter Oberdörster, a profes-
sor of environmental medicine at the 
University of Rochester School of Medicine 
and Dentistry. According to Oberdörster, 
multiwalled carbon nanotubes have been 
found to elicit responses similar to those 
seen with fibers of chrysotile asbestos, a 
known human carcinogen. Oberdörster 
emphasizes these findings have been seen 
only in rodents given carbon nanotubes at 
extremely high doses by injection. What’s 
needed now, he says, are toxicity data gen-
erated by inhalation routes that mimic real-
life human exposure. Oberdörster says he 
and others in the field are currently work-
ing on such studies. 
Predictions about nanotechnology risk 
have emerged from inhalation research, spe-
cifically studies targeting ultrafine soot par-
ticles with nanoscale dimensions. Upon inha-
lation, some of these particles traverse epithe-
lial and endothelial cells to reach the blood 
and lymph circulation, which carries them to 
potentially sensitive sites, including the bone 
marrow, lymph nodes, spleen, heart, and cen-
tral nervous system. In vitro and animal stud-
ies show these particles can—depending on 
the dose and chemical composition—induce 
a range of inflammatory effects, whereas epi-
demiologic findings link them to respiratory 
and cardiovascular diseases.
All nanoparticles have high surface-to-
mass ratios, which makes them uniquely 
reactive in the body. “Chemical reactions 
tend to occur at particle surfaces,” explains 
Jeff Morris, associate director for science in 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) Office of Science Policy. “Given that 
their surface area exceeds their mass, nano-
particles tend to be more reactive than larger 
particles with the same chemical makeup.”
Engineered nanoparticles and soot dif-
fer in key ways, however. In particular, soot 
is hetero  geneous in terms of particle size, 
chemistry, surface characteristics, and other 
constituents, whereas engineered nano-
particles—within product categories—have 
uniformly identical shapes, including spheres, 
tubes, wires, rings, and planes. Given their 
similar high surface-to-volume ratios, both 
types of particles could trigger comparable 
biologic effects, Oberdörster adds. 
But particle uniformity might also 
influence the kinetics and toxicity of nano-
materials in unknown ways. For instance, 
Andrew Maynard, science advisor to The 
Project on Emerging Nanotechnologies, a 
collaboration of the Pew Charitable Trust 
and  the  Woodrow  Wilson  Center  for 
International Scholars, proposes that some of 
the particles in soot and other heterogeneous 
mixtures could be more harmful than oth-
ers. “In that case, the toxicity of the harmful 
particles is diluted by the presence of others 
that are less so,” he explains. “But when you 
engineer particles with precise characteristics, 
you lose that dilution factor, and the chance 
of producing something uniformly danger-
ous increases.” 
Looking for a Strategy
The NRC panelists would like to see a 
national, health-based strategy for nanotech-
nology research, with defined goals, mile-
stones, and mechanisms for assessing prog-
ress. Maynard stresses the need isn’t just to 
ensure the safety of nano-enabled products, 
but also to avert a public backlash against 
the technology, which could grow if health 
risks aren’t seen to be adequately addressed. 
Yet the NNI strategy document—NRC 
panelists claim—is simply a compendium 
of federally funded projects without any 
unifying vision or sense of shared purpose. 
Each of the projects listed by the NNI is 
grouped under one of five research catego-
ries: instrumentation, metrology, and ana-
lytical methods; nano  materials and human 
health; nanomaterials and the environment; 
human and environmental exposure assess-
ment; and risk management methods. 
In Maynard’s view, these projects aren’t 
adequately organized around questions of 
public concern. Instead, they reflect investi-
gator-motivated studies, piqued by each sci-
entist’s own interests, he asserts. “Scientists 
don’t like being told what to do,” Maynard 
acknowledges. “But there’s a disconnect 
between what might interest them and what 
companies and regulators who deal with 
nanotechnology actually need.”
Sally Tinkle, senior science advisor in the 
NIEHS Office of the Director and cochair 
of the Nanoscale Science, Engineering, and 
Technology (NSET) subcommittee of the 
National Science and Technology Council, 
says federal agencies have had to make do 
without any federal appropriation specif-
ically for nanotoxicology research. “The 
agencies have to fund what they can under 
flat budgets with competing research priori-
ties,” she says. 
A prepublication copy of the NRC 
report was leaked to the press 10 December 
2 0 0 8 .  T h e  e n s u i n g  m e d i a  a t t e n t i o n  
prompted the NNI on 5 January 2009 to 
post an 18-page rebuttal on its website, 
http://www.nano.gov/, which stated that 
the strategy document is not, and was never 
intended to be, a strategic plan or an imple-
mentation plan, but rather a higher-level 
description of the interagency approach 
to nano  technology-related EHS research; 
“[i]t was written as a strategy document 
for federal agencies in order to coordinate, 
encourage cooperation, and where possible 
to implement collaborative research actitiv-
ies.” The rebuttal goes on to list what it calls 
technical errors in the NRC assessment. 
Although such errors were corrected in the 
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he NEHI Working Group developed this . . . research strategy to 
accelerate progress in research to protect public health and the 
environment, and to fill gaps in, and—with the growing level of 
effort worldwide—to avoid unnecessary duplication of, such research.
— NNI Strategy Document           
final February 2009 release, the NRC did 
not change its overall conclusions.
Of paramount importance, Wiesner 
says, is that exposure and toxicity research in 
nanotechnology be balanced appropriately. 
“We don’t want the toxicity work to get too 
far out in front of the exposure work, and 
yet the toxicity work tells us where we should 
focus our exposure studies,” he says. “There’s 
a delicate balance we need to achieve here, 
and that’s something the whole research 
community is struggling with right now.”
Exposure research in nanotechnology 
does come with unique challenges, Wiesner 
acknowledges. Scientists have yet to develop 
widely accepted methods for introducing 
nanomaterials into living systems such as 
cell cultures, for instance. As nanomaterial 
surfaces interact with cell macromolecules 
and salts, their properties can change in mys-
terious ways. And those transformations, 
Wiesner says, directly influence interpreta-
tions of effective exposure and dose response.
Questions Regarding Transparency
Meanwhile, given mounting scrutiny, indus-
try has become more sensitive about its pub-
lic image vis-à-vis nanomaterials, according 
to Ellen Kenney, a senior research analyst 
with the Bethesda investment firm Calvert 
Group, Ltd. Companies that don’t use nano-
materials have begun stating so in their 
shareholder reports, she says, in a reflection 
of how these materials might be viewed as a 
public liability. 
Indeed, many companies are reluctant 
to reveal their nanomaterial use and toxic-
ity data voluntarily. With its Nanoscale 
Materials Stewardship Program (NMSP), 
launched 28 January 2008, the EPA urges 
companies to report available information 
about the engineered nanoscale materials 
they manufacture, import, process, or use. 
This voluntary two-year effort is intended 
to help inform eventual regulatory deci-
sions about nanomaterials. According to 
Lux Research, the total number of com-
panies engaged in nanotech production or 
use could reach 1,000. The EPA reached 
out to more than 150 companies and 11 
trade associations, Hwang says, but by 
the time the NMSP published its interim 
report on 12 January 2009, only 29 com-
panies had responded. In total, these com-
panies disclosed data on 123 nanomaterial 
compounds. 
Jim  Willis,  who  directs  the  EPA 
Chemical Control Division, says those 
results left agency personnel with mixed feel-
ings. “On the one hand, we thought it was 
pretty good responsiveness for a volunteer 
program,” he says. “On the other, we know 
there are hundreds of other nanomaterials 
that weren’t reported. And that indicates 
clearly that we need to do more if we want 
to get a better handle on what’s being pro-
duced, at what levels, and how humans are 
being exposed.” 
Sources interviewed for this article 
unanimously agreed that nanomateri-
als promise valuable benefits for society, 
among them better drugs; stronger, lighter 
products; and better environmental and 
energy technologies. But nanoparticle tox-
icity data need to be made more widely 
available to ensure public support for the 
technology. Jennifer Sass, a staff scien-
tist with the Natural Resources Defense 
Council, says such data typically wind up 
in company reports instead of in publicly 
available, peer-reviewed research journals. 
And Julia Moore, deputy director of The 
Project on Emerging Nanotechnology, 
claims the public has limited access to 
information about which companies use 
nanomaterials and how. “That information 
isn’t in the hands of government regula-
tors,” she says. “It’s in the hands of market 
analysts on Wall Street, and they’re not 
going to let it go without a price.” 
Those on the industry side believe 
many interest groups have significantly 
overhyped the dangers of nanomaterials. 
“Fear-mongering both inhibits industry 
efforts to encourage companies utilizing 
nano  technology to do so in a visible way 
by ‘branding’ it and makes it more difficult 
for entrepreneurs to raise capital and find 
partners to bring new innovations to mar-
ket,” says Sean Murdoch, executive direc-
tor of the Nanobusiness Alliance, a trade 
group based in Skokie, Illinois. He cites 
the comparison between carbon nanotubes 
and chrysotile asbestos as an example. He 
points out that, unlike asbestos, which for 
decades was mined at million-ton quantities 
by unprotected workers, carbon nanotubes 
are processed in laboratories subject to strict 
safety protocols. Moreover, he says, the nan-
otubes themselves, once incorporated into 
products, have no bioavailability. “There’s 
no way the exposure scenarios are compa-
rable,” he says. 
But this argument does not address 
product end-of-life concerns, say many 
experts. Tinkle says, “There is still concern 
over exposure to nanoparticles at the end of 
the products’ life cycles, even if companies 
design the product to be completely safe for 
the immediate user. Once [a nano-enabled 
item] is thrown out and begins to decom-
pose or degrade—or it begins to break down 
from day-to-day use—the particles can be 
released into the environment. Care needs to 
be taken to control the exposure throughout 
the product life cycle.”
For his part, Oberdörster suggests most 
nanoparticles may turn out to be benign 
under real-life exposure conditions. “I 
think there’s a certain amount of hype 
surrounding the toxicity issues,” he says. 
“However, until we know better, we should 
be careful and avoid exposure. You can do 
a lot of in vitro testing at high doses and 
identify a hazard, but you need the neces-
sary exposure for a risk to be present.” 
Still, assuming the growth trends con-
tinue, nanomaterials will be produced at 
ever-increasing quantities, and public and 
environmental exposures will rise commen-
surately. Given that reality, the industry’s 
future may well rest on its transparency to 
public scrutiny.
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T
he process of composing the government’s 2008 NNI document 
provided a unique and useful opportunity for coordination, 
planning, and consensus-building among NEHI-member federal 
agencies. . . . However, [the document] does not have the essential 
elements of a research strategy—it does not present a vision, contain 
a clear set of goals, have a plan of action for how the goals are to 
be achieved, or describe mechanisms to review and evaluate funded 
research and assess whether progress has been achieved in the 
context of what we know about the potential EHS risks posed by 
nanotechnology.
—NRC report